Case Info: A.A.R.P. v. Trump, Case No. 24A1007 | Date Decided: 5/16/25 Link to Docket: Here . Question Presented: Whether Venezuelan nationals detained as alleged members of a terrorist organization are entitled to constitutionally adequate notice and opportunity to challenge their removal before being deported under the Alien Enemies Act, and if so, what minimum notice requirements must the government provide to satisfy due process. Plain Language Breakdown: In this case, the Supreme Court decided that Venezuelan nationals detained by the government as alleged members of a terrorist organization must receive adequate notice before being removed from the United States under the Alien Enemies Act. The Court found that the District Court's inaction for over 14 hours constituted a constructive denial of the detainees' request for emergency relief, and that due process requires notice that allows detainees a meaningful opportunity to challenge their removal through habeas proceedings. The Court vacated the Fifth Circuit's dismissal of the appeal and granted an injunction preventing the government from removing class members until the Fifth Circuit could determine what level of notice is constitutionally required. Justice Kavanaugh concurred, agreeing with the temporary injunction but expressing a preference for the Supreme Court to resolve the critical legal issues promptly rather than remanding to lower courts. Justice Alito, joined by Justice Thomas, dissented, arguing that the Court lacked jurisdiction because the District Court's actions were reasonable given the circumstances and insufficient evidence was presented to prove imminent harm to the detainees; he also questioned whether class relief could be obtained in habeas proceedings and whether the requirements for class certification could be met in this case. Voting Details: The Supreme Court delivered a Per Curiam opinion. Justice Kavanaugh wrote a concurring opinion. Justice Alito wrote a dissenting opinion, with whom Justice Thomas joined. Link to Opinion: Here . Timestamps: 00:00 Introduction and Plain Language Breakdown 02:10 Summary of Per Curiam Opinion 12:47 Summary of Justice Kavanaugh Concurring Opinion 14:33 Summary of Justice Kavanaugh Dissenting Opinion…

Here are some highlights from the Trump v. CASA, Inc. case heard on May 15, 2025. Justice Kagan and Justice Barrett went viral for their questions. Those portions begin around 09:17. Please see the oral argument episode for additional case details. As always, I welcome any feedback on the episode or podcast. Email: scotus.cases.pod@gmail.com.…

Case Info: Trump, President of U.S. v. CASA, Inc. | Case No. 24A884 | Date Argued: 5/15/25 Consolidation Note: The following cases were consolidated: (1) Trump, President of U.S. v. CASA, Inc., Case No. 24A884; (2) Trump, President of U.S. v. Washington, Case No. 24A885; and (3) Trump, President of U.S. v. New Jersey, Case No. 24A886. Parties: Applicants: United States and Federal Officials Respondents: (1) States and cities such as New Jersey, California, Delaware, Massachusetts, and the City and County of San Francisco; (2) Immigrant rights organizations such as CASA, Inc. and Asylum Seeker Advocacy Project, Inc; and (3) private individuals. Links to Docket: Here (Case No. 24A884); Here (Case No. 24A885); and Here (Case No. 24A886). Question Presented: Whether the Supreme Court should stay the district courts' nationwide preliminary injunctions on the Trump administration’s 1/20/25 executive order ending birthright citizenship except as to the individual plaintiffs and identified members of the organizational plaintiffs or states. Background: On January 20, 2025, President Trump issued an Executive Order regarding birthright citizenship. Section 1 of the Order recognizes that the Constitution and the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq., confer citizenship upon all persons born in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof. Specifically, the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that “[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.” U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, § 1. That provision, known as the Citizenship Clause, repudiated Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393 (1857), which infamously misinterpreted the Constitution to deny U.S. citizenship to people of African descent based solely on their race. Congress has reaffirmed the Citizenship Clause in the INA, which provides that “a person born in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,” is a citizen of the United States. 8 U.S.C. 1401(a). Section 1 of the Order identifies two circumstances in which a person born in the United States is not subject to its jurisdiction: “(1) when that person’s mother was unlawfully present in the United States and the father was not a United States citizen or lawful permanent resident at the time of said person’s birth, or (2) when that 6 person’s mother’s presence in the United States at the time of said person’s birth was lawful but temporary (such as, but not limited to, visiting the United States under the auspices of the Visa Waiver Program or visiting on a student, work, or tourist visa) and the father was not a United States citizen or lawful permanent resident at the time of said person’s birth.” Citizenship Order § 1. Section 2 of the Order directs the Executive Branch (1) not to issue documents recognizing U.S. citizenship to the persons identified in Section 1 and (2) not to accept documents issued by state, local, or other governments purporting to recognize the U.S. citizenship of such persons. See Citizenship Order § 2(a). Section 2 specifies that those directives “apply only to persons who are born within the United States after 30 days from the date of this order,” i.e., after February 19. Id. § 2(b). Three district courts in Maryland, Massachusetts, and Washington have issued overlapping nationwide injunctions at the behest of 22 States, two organizations, and seven individuals. Those universal injunctions prohibit a Day 1 Executive Order from being enforced anywhere in the country, as to “hundreds of thousands” of unspecified individuals who are “not before the court nor identified by the court.” Three Circuit Courts of Appeals refused to limit the nationwide injunctions. Applicant's Position: The Solicitor General argues that universal injunctions have reached crisis levels, particularly since the start of the current Administration in 2025. The Solicitor General notes that district courts issued more universal injunctions and temporary restraining orders in February 2025 alone than through the first three years of the Biden Administration. The Solicitor General contends this trend prevents the Executive Branch from performing its constitutional functions before courts can fully examine the merits of those actions, and threatens to overwhelm the Supreme Court's emergency docket. The Solicitor General asserts that the universal injunctions in this case are particularly problematic because they extend to all 50 states and millions of aliens nationwide, even though tailored relief for the actual plaintiffs would fully address their alleged harms. The Solicitor General argues the injunctions were improperly granted to States that lack standing to raise Citizenship Clause claims, defying the principle that States may only assert their own rights, not those of third parties. Furthermore, the Solicitor General contends the injunctions improperly bar federal agencies from even developing implementation guidance, and the overlapping nature of multiple universal injunctions from different courts creates a "jurisdictionally messy" scenario where the government must prevail in multiple appeals to implement the Order anywhere. Respondents' Position: Respondents argue that this case presents a uniquely poor candidate for challenging universal injunctions. They emphasize that the Executive Order directly conflicts with binding Supreme Court precedent interpreting the Citizenship Clause, and the government notably does not even attempt to defend the Order's constitutionality in its emergency application. The Respondents contend that while emergency relief might be appropriate in some cases to limit the geographic scope of relief, it is not appropriate where the Supreme Court has already settled the precise constitutional question for the entire nation. Respondents also argue that the government failed to demonstrate any significant or irreparable harm that would justify emergency relief, let alone warrant contravening nationwide precedent. They point out that the injunctions merely protect a status quo regarding birthright citizenship that dates back to English common law and has existed throughout American history, except for the aberration of Dred Scott. Respondents emphasize that maintaining this status quo until the cases are resolved imposes no harm on the Executive Branch, while stripping hundreds of thousands of American-born children of their citizenship would inflict tremendous and irreparable harms on the States and the public. Oral Advocates: For Applicants: D. John Sauer, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For State and City Respondents: Jeremy M. Feigenbaum, Solicitor General, Trenton, N.J. For Private Respondents: Kelsi B. Corkran, Washington, D.C. Timestamps: [00:00:00] Introduction [00:00:14] Applicant's Opening Statement Begins [00:02:13] Applicant Free for All Questions Begin [00:27:45] Applicant Sequential Questions Begin [01:03:17] Applicant Questions End, Respondent (State and City) Opening Statement Begins [01:05:25] Respondent (State and City) Free for All Questions Begin [01:19:03] Respondent (State and City) Sequential Questions Begin [01:43:37] Respondent (State and City) Questions End, Respondent (Private) Opening Statement Begins [01:44:56] Respondent (Private) Free for All Questions Begin [02:00:10] Respondent (Private) Sequential Questions Begin [02:13:40] Respondent (Private) Questions End, Applicant Rebuttal Begins…

Case Info: Barnes v. Felix | Case No. 23-1239 | Date Argued: 1/22/25 | Date Decided: 5/15/25 Link to Docket: Here . Background: The Fourth Amendment prohibits a police officer from using "unreasonable" force. U.S. Const. amend. IV. In Graham v. Connor, this Court held that reasonableness depends on "the totality of the circumstances." 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (quotation marks omitted). But four circuits-the Second, Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth-cabin Graham. Those circuits evaluate whether a Fourth Amendment violation occurred under the "moment of the threat doctrine," which evaluates the reasonableness of an officer's actions only in the narrow window when the officer's safety was threatened, and not based on events that precede the moment of the threat. In contrast, eight circuits-the First, Third, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits-reject the moment of the threat doctrine and follow the totality of the circumstances approach, including evaluating the officer's actions leading up to the use of force. In the decision below, Judge Higginbotham concurred in his own majority opinion, explaining that the minority approach "lessens the Fourth Amendment's protection of the American public" and calling on this Court "to resolve the circuit divide over the application of a doctrine deployed daily across this country." Pet. App. 10a-16a (Higginbotham, J., concurring). Question Presented: Whether courts should apply the moment of the threat doctrine when evaluating an excessive force claim under the Fourth Amendment. Holding: A claim that a law enforcement officer used excessive force during a stop or arrest is analyzed under the Fourth Amendment, which re­quires that the force deployed be objectively reasonable from the per­spective of a reasonable officer at the scene. The inquiry into the reasonableness of police force re­quires analyzing the totality of the circumstances. That analysis demands careful attention to the facts and circum­stances relating to the incident. Most notable here, the totality of the circumstances inquiry has no time limit. Result: Vacated and remanded. Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion, in which Justices Thomas, Alito, and Barrett joined. Link to Opinion: Here . Oral Advocates: For Petitioner: Nathaniel A.G. Zelinsky, Washington, D. C.; and Zoe A. Jacoby, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) For Respondents: Charles L. McCloud, Washington, D. C.; and Lanora C. Pettit, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Austin, Tex. (for Texas, et al., as amici curiae.) Website Link to Oral Argument: Here . Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here . Timestamps: [00:00] Introduction [00:38] Justice Kagan Unanimous Opinion [04:35] Justice Kavanaugh Concurring Opinion [10:12] Case Implications…

In Memoriam: A Reflection on the Remarkable Journey of Justice David Souter Episode Overview In this special memorial episode, we discuss the remarkable life and judicial career of Justice David H. Souter, a Supreme Court Justice who defied political expectations and remained committed to principled jurisprudence. Key Highlights Born: September 17, 1939 in Melrose, Massachusetts Appointed to Supreme Court: 1990 by President George H.W. Bush Retired: 2009 (succeeded by Justice Sotomayor) Passed Away: May 8, 2025 Notable Career Milestones Rhodes Scholar at Oxford University New Hampshire Attorney General Associate Justice of New Hampshire Supreme Court Judge on the First Circuit Court of Appeals Supreme Court Justice (1990-2009) Landmark Cases Discussed 1. Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992) (Opinion Here ) Co-authored opinion affirming Roe v. Wade Crafted influential section on judicial precedent 2. Bush v. Gore (2000) (Opinion Here ) Demonstrated judicial independence Critiqued recount process while questioning judicial overreach Judicial Philosophy Highlights Believed law should adapt to empirical realities Advocated for judicial restraint Supported separation of church and state Consistently prioritized legal principles over political expectations The Supreme Court issued two press releases: Here and Here .…

Episode Description: This episode features a May 7, 2025 conversation between Supreme Court Chief Justice John Roberts and U.S. District Judge Lawrence J. Vilardo. They discuss why judicial independence matters in our democracy and how it helps balance power between different parts of government. Both judges share stories about their personal backgrounds, law school experiences, and key moments in their careers. They also talk about what makes legal writing effective and why court decisions should be written clearly so everyone can understand them. The conversation gives listeners a unique look into the thoughts of two important judges as they reflect on their shared history and how the legal world has changed over time. Background: On May 7, 2025, Chief Justice John Roberts headlined the Western District of New York 125th Anniversary Dinner Event in Buffalo, NY. As part of this event, U.S. District Judge Lawrence J. Vilardo interviewed Chief Justice Roberts. From the Event's press release: “Chief Justice Roberts was born in Buffalo and spent his early childhood here, so we claim him as one of our own,” said Chief U.S. District Judge Elizabeth Wolford. “His willingness to join us for our 125th Anniversary makes the celebration all the more special. It’s a testament to Western New York’s rich legal history and the Chief Justice’s commitment to our profession.” Event Press Release: Here . H/T to WGRZ-TV for the recording. Timestamps: 00:00 Welcoming Remarks and Reflections 00:57 Reflecting on the Past: A Journey Back to Buffalo 09:26 The Art of Writing Clearly 14:07 Judicial Independence and Its Implications 25:42 The Role of the Chief Justice in Public Life 32:04 Reflections on Two Decades on the Court 38:43 The Evolution of Legal Perspectives 43:20 The Influence of Judicial Mentorship 48:35 Reflections on Clerking and the Law…

Case Info: United States v. Shilling | Order Decided: 5/6/25 | Case No. 24A1030 Link to Docket: Here . Question Presented: Whether the Supreme Court should stay the nationwide injunction issued by the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington. Plain English Translation: This order means that the district court’s nationwide injunction is on hold until final adjudication of the case on the merits. The district court’s nationwide injunction prohibited the Department of Defense from implementing a policy that generally disqualifies from military service individuals who have gender dysphoria or have undergone medical interventions for gender dysphoria. Voting Breakdown: The Order is unsigned. Justice Sotomayor, Justice Kagan, and Justice Jackson would deny the application. Timestamps: 00:00 Introduction 00:16 Question Presented 00:28 Emergency Order Text 01:23 Voting Breakdown 01:31 Plain English Order Summary 02:07 Procedural History - Policy Adoption 02:39 Procedural History - Respondent Identities 02:52 Procedural History - District Court Orders 04:39 Procedural History - Government Appeals Denial of Stay of Nationwide Injunction to 9th Circuit; 9th Circuit Denies Appeal 05:15 Procedural History - Government Appeals Applies to Supreme Court for a Stay 05:20 Summary of Government Application - The Policy Satisfies Rational Basis Review 06:42 Summary of Government Application - The Policy Comports with the First Amendment 07:49 Summary of Government Application - The Policy Complies with the Due Process Clause and Principles of Equity 07:59 Summary of Government Application - The District Court Erred in Issuing a Nationwide Injunction 10:04 Summary of Government Application - The Remaining Factors Support the Issuance of a Stay…

Case Info: Oklahoma Statewide Charter School Board v. Drummond | Case No. 24-394 | Date Argued: 4/30/25 Link to Docket: Here . Background: This Court has "repeatedly held that a State violates the Free Exercise Clause when it excludes religious observers from otherwise available public benefits." Carson as next friend of O. C. v. Makin, 596 U.S. 767, 778 (2022). Three times, the Court has applied that principle to strike down "state efforts to withhold otherwise available public benefits from religious organizations." Id. at 778-79 (citing Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 582 U.S. 449 (2017); Espinoza v. Mont. Dep't of Revenue, 591 U.S. 464 (2020)). Contrary to those precedents, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that a state can exclude privately owned and operated religious charter schools from its charter-school program by enforcing state-law bans on "sectarian" and religiously affiliated charter schools. The court also held that a charter school engages in state action for constitutional purposes when it contracts with the state to provide publicly funded education. Questions Presented: Whether the academic and pedagogical choices of a privately owned and run school constitute state action simply because it contracts with the state to offer a free educational option for interested students. Whether a state violates the Free Exercise Clause by excluding privately run religious schools from the state's charter-school program solely because the schools are religious, or whether a state can justify such an exclusion by invoking anti-establishment interests that go further than the Establishment Clause requires. Host Notes: Justice Barrett did not participate in this case. Also, this case was consolidated with St. Isidore of Seville Sch. v. Drummond , Case No. 24-396. Oral Advocates: For Petitioners in 24-394: James A. Campbell For Petitioner in 24-396: Michael H. McGinley For United States, as Amicus Curiae: D. John Sauer, Solicitor General, Department of Justice For Respondent: Gregory G. Garre Timestamps: 00:00 Introduction 00:08 Petitioner (in 24-394) Opening Statement Begins 2:00 Petitioner Free for All Questions Begins 11:10 Petitioner Sequential Questions Begin 37:16 Petitioner Questions End, Petitioner (in 24-396) Opening Statement Begins 38:28 Petitioner Free for All Questions Begin 44:57 Petitioner Sequential Questions Begin 58:15, Petitioner Questions End, Government (as Amicus Curiae) Opening Statement Begins 59:13 Government Free for All Questions Begin 1:08:32 Government Sequential Questions Begin 1:17:33 Government Questions End, Respondent Opening Statement Begins 1:20:01 Respondent Free for All Questions Begin 1:48:30 Respondent Sequential Questions Begin 2:08:50 Respondent Questions End, Petitioner Rebuttal Begins…

Case Info: Feliciano v. Department of Transportation | Date Decided: 4/30/25 | Case No. 23-861 Link to Docket: Here . Question Presented: Whether a federal civilian employee called or ordered to active duty under a provision of law during a national emergency is entitled to differential pay even if the duty is not directly connected to the national emergency. Holding: A federal civilian employee called to active duty pursuant to “any other provision of law . . . during a national emergency” as described in §101(a)(13)(B) is entitled to differential pay if the reservist’s service temporally coincides with a declared national emergency without any showing that the service bears a substantive connection to a particular emergency. Result: Reversed and remanded. Voting Breakdown: Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Alito, Kagan and Jackson joined. Link to Opinion: Here . Oral Advocates: For Petitioner: Andrew T. Tutt For Respondent: Nicole F. Reaves, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice Website Link to Oral Argument: Here . Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here . Timestamps: 00:00 Introduction 00:15 Question Presented 00:23 Voting Breakdown 00:40 Justice Gorsuch Majority Opinion 08:10 Result 08:11 Justice Thomas Dissenting Opinion 14:41 Case Implications…

Case Info: Advocate Christ Medical Center v. Kennedy | Date Decided: 4/29/25 | Case No. 23-715 Link to Docket: Here . Question Presented: Does the phrase "entitled ... to benefits," used twice in the same sentence of the Medicare Act, mean the same thing for Medicare part A and supplementary security income (SSI), such that it includes all who meet basic program eligibility criteria, whether or not benefits are actually received. Holding: In calculating the Medicare fraction, an individual is “entitled to[SSI] benefits” for purposes of the Medicare fraction when she is eligi­ble to receive an SSI cash payment during the month of her hospitali­zation. Result: Affirmed. Voting Breakdown: Justice Barrett delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Kagan, Gorsuch and Kavanaugh joined. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Sotomayor joined. Link to Opinion: Here . Advocates: For Petitioners: Melissa Arbus Sherry For Respondent: Ephraim McDowell, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice Website Link to Oral Argument: Here . Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here .…

Case Info: Martin v. United States | Case No. 24-362 | Date Argued: 4/29/25 Link to Docket: Here . Background: Petitioners are the innocent victims of a wrong-house raid conducted by an FBI SWAT team in Atlanta, Georgia. Seeking a remedy for torts committed against them, Petitioners brought a cause of action against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act. In its opinion below, the Eleventh Circuit held that all of Petitioners' FTCA claims are barred by sovereign immunity supplied either through the Constitution's Supremacy Clause or the FTCA's discretionary-function exception. In one or more ways, the opinion below conflicts with decisions from every other circuit. Questions Presented: Whether the Constitution's Supremacy Clause bars claims under the FTCA-a federal statute enacted by Congress-when the negligent or wrongful acts of federal employees "have some nexus with furthering federal policy and can reasonably be characterized as complying with the full range of federal law." Pet. App. 17a (quotation omitted). Whether the FTCA's discretionary-function exception bars claims for torts arising from wrong-house raids and similar negligent or wrongful acts by federal employees. Oral Advocates: For Petitioners: Patrick M. Jaicomo For Respondents: Frederick Liu, Assistant to the Solicitor General For Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae in Support of Judgment Below on Question 1: Christopher E. Mills Timestamps: 00:00 Introduction 00:05 Petitioner Opening Statement Begins 02:11 Petitioner Free for All Questions Begin 21:58 Petitioner Sequential Questions Begin 22:06 Petitioner Questions End, Respondent Opening Statement Begins 23:53 Respondent Free for All Questions Begin 37:10 Respondent Sequential Questions Begin 39:31 Respondent Questions End, Court Appointed Amicus Curiae Opening Statement Begins 40:33 Court Appointed Amicus Curiae Free for All Questions Begin 46:45 Court Appointed Amicus Curiae Sequential Questions Begin 46:51 Petitioner Rebuttal Begins…

Case Info: Laboratory Corp. of America v. Davis | Case No. 24-304 | Date Argued: 4/29/25 Link to Docket: Here . Question Presented: Whether a federal court may certify a class action when some of its members lack any Article III injury. Oral Advocates: For Petitioner: Noel J. Francisco For United States, as Amicus Curiae: Sopan Joshi, Assistant to the Solicitor General For Respondents: Deepak Gupta Timestamps: 00:00 Introduction 00:06 Petitioner Opening Statement Begins 02:16 Petitioner Free for All Questions Begin 21:22 Petitioner Sequential Questions Begin 1:09:22 Petitioner Questions End, Government Opening Statement Begins 1:10:41 Government Free for All Questions Begin 1:20:15 Government Sequential Questions Begin 1:36:29 Government Questions End, Respondent Opening Statement Begins 1:38:22 Respondent Free for All Questions Begin 2:06:52 Respondent Sequential Questions Begin 2:12:05 Respondent Questions End, Petitioner Rebuttal Begins…

Case Info: Soto v. United States | Case No. 24-320 | Date Argued: 4/28/25 Link to Docket: Here . Background: This case determines whether thousands of medically retired combat veterans should receive all the combat related special compensation (CRSC) that Congress specifically authorized for combat veterans. The government has elected to calculate the period of retroactive compensation due using the procedure in the Barring Act (31 U.S.C. § 3702) instead of the one in the CRSC statute (10 U.S.C. § 1413a)-a maneuver that allows the government to apply the Barring Act's six- year limitations period in order to pay the veterans less. But the Barring Act is a default provision and does not apply where "another law" provides a procedure for calculating the amount due-that is, for "settling" a demand for payment. Although this Court's precedent defines "settlement" of demands for payment from the federal government as "the administrative determination of the amount due," it has not decided the test for whether a statute provides a settlement procedure that should apply in place of the Barring Act. And agency practice more broadly-which aligns with the test the District Court articulated and is consistent with this Court's definition of "settlement"-is irreconcilable with the novel test that the Federal Circuit applied, although both tests claim reliance on this Court's definition of "settlement." Question Presented: When a person makes a demand for money from the federal government pursuant to federal statute, what test should courts and agencies use to determine whether that statute includes a settlement procedure that displaces the default procedures and limitations set forth in the Barring Act (31 U.S.C. § 3702)? Oral Advocates: For Petitioner: Tacy F. Flint, Chicago, Ill. For Respondent: Caroline A. Flynn, Assistant to the Solicitor General Timestamps: 00:00 Introduction 00:05 Petitioner Opening Statement Begins 2:07 Petitioner Free for All Questions Begin 25:24 Petitioner Sequential Questions Begin 30:00 Petitioner Questions End, Respondent Opening Statement Begins 32:01 Respondent Free for All Questions Begin 57:40 Respondent Sequential Questions Begin 57:46 Respondent Questions End, Petitioner Rebuttal Begins…

Case Info: A. J. T. v. Osseo Area Schools | Case No. 24-249 | Date Argued: 4/28/25 Link to Docket: Here . Background: Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (Rehabilitation Act) require public entities and organizations that receive federal funding to provide reasonable accommodations for people with disabilities. In the decision below, the Eighth Circuit held that, for discrimination claims "based on educational services" brought by children with disabilities, these statutes are violated only if school officials acted with ''bad faith or gross misjudgment." App.3a. That test squarely implicates an entrenched and acknowledged 5-2 circuit split over the standard governing such claims. It is also plainly mistaken on the merits: As the Eighth Circuit itself acknowledged, the test lacks "any anchor in statutory text," App.5a n.2, and it arbitrarily departs from the more lenient standards that all courts-including the Eighth Circuit-apply to ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims brought by plaintiffs outside the school setting. Question Presented: Whether the ADA and Rehabilitation Act require children with disabilities to satisfy a uniquely stringent "bad faith or gross misjudgment" standard when seeking relief for discrimination relating to their education. Oral Advocates: For Petitioner: Roman Martinez For the United States, as Amicus Curiae: Nicole F. Reaves, Assistant to the Solicitor General For Respondents: Lisa S. Blatt Host Note: This is probably the sauciest oral argument I've heard this term. Respondent's counsel accuses Petitioner of lying and of asking the Court to consider "uniquely stupid standards." Respondent's counsel also accused the Supreme Court of routinely remanding cases without setting the law. All of these statements clearly made the justices uncomfortable. I included timestamps for these exchanges. Timestamps: 00:00 Introduction 00:07 Petitioner Opening Statement Begins 2:04 Petitioner Free for All Questions Begin 18:06 Petitioner Sequential Questions Begin 23:04 Petitioner Questions End, Government Opening Statement Begins 24:29 Government Free for All Questions Begin 33:42 Government Sequential Questions Begin 45:17 Government Questions End, Respondent Opening Statement Begins 47:16 Respondent Free for All Questions Begin 50:26 Respondent alleges that Petitioner lied and made inaccurate statements about Respondent’s position 50:55 Justice Gorsuch tells Respondent to be more careful with her words with respect to alleging that Petitioner lied 52:03 Respondent states that Petitioner asks the court to adopt “uniquely stupid standards.” 1:03:17 Justice Jackson and Respondent debate whether 504 and Title II require reasonable accommodations 1:04:31 Respondent admonishes the Supreme Court for sometimes “just remand[ing] and saying we just remand” and for not “set[ting] the law.” 1:05:01 Justice Gorsuch tells Respondent that he’s troubled by Respondent’s “suggestion that your friends on the other side have lied[]” and asks Respondent “to reconsider that phrase.” Respondent backtracks and says that Petitioner is incorrect. 1:07:24 Justice Gorsuch asks Respondent to withdraw her accusation that Petitioner lied. Respondent obliges. 1:16:23 Respondent Sequential Questions Begin 1:22:38 Respondent Questions End, Petitioner Reply Begins…

Case Info: Diamond Alternative Energy, LLC v. EPA | Case No. 24-7 | Date Argued: 04/23/25 Link to Docket: Here . Background: Section 209(a) of the Clean Air Act generally preempts States from adopting emission standards for new motor vehicles. 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a). But under Section 209(b) of that Act, EPA may grant California and only California-a waiver from federal preemption to set its own vehicle-emission standards. Before granting a preemption waiver, EPA must find that California "need[s]" its own emission standards "to meet compelling and extraordinary conditions." Id. § 7543(b)(1)(B). In 2022, EPA granted California a waiver to set its own standards for greenhouse-gas emissions and to adopt a zero-emission-vehicle mandate, both expressly intended to address global climate change by reducing California vehicles' consumption of liquid fuel. Fuel producers challenged EPA's waiver as contrary to the text of Section 209(b). The D.C. Circuit rejected the challenge without reaching the merits, concluding that fuel producers' injuries were not redressable because they had not established that vacating EPA's waiver would have any effect on automakers. Questions Presented: Whether a party may establish the redressability component of Article III standing by relying on the coercive and predictable effects of regulation on third parties. Whether EPA's preemption waiver for California's greenhouse-gas emission standards and zero-emission- vehicle mandate is unlawful. Oral Advocates: For Petitioners: Jeffrey B. Wall For Federal Respondents: Edwin S. Kneedler, Deputy Solicitor General For State Respondents: Joshua A. Klein, Deputy Solicitor General, Oakland, Cal.…

Case Info: Velazquez v. Bondi, Att'y Gen. | Date Decided: 4/22/25 | Case No. 23-929 Link to Docket: Here . Question Presented: When a noncitizen's voluntary-departure period ends on a weekend or public holiday, is a motion to reopen filed the next business day sufficient to avoid the penalties for failure to depart? Holding: Under §1229c(b)(2), a voluntary-departure deadline that falls on a weekend or legal holiday extends to the next business day. Result: Reversed and remanded. Voting Breakdown: Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court, in which the following justices joined: Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Sotomayor, Justice Kagan, and Justice Jackson. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Alito, and joined by Justice Kavanaugh and Justice Barrett as to Parts I and II. Justice Alito and Justice Barrett filed dissenting opinions, both joined by Justice Kavanaugh. Link to Opinion: Here . Oral Advocates: For Petitioner: Gerard J. Cedrone For Respondent: Anthony A. Yang, Assistant to the Solicitor General Website Link to Oral Argument: Here . Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here . Host Note: Please note that the opinion date is April 22, 2025.…

Case Info: Mahmoud v. Taylor | Case No. 24-297 | Date Argued: 4/22/25 Link to Docket: Here . Background: Respondent Montgomery County Board of Education requires elementary school teachers to read their students storybooks celebrating gender transitions, Pride parades, and same-sex playground romance. The storybooks were chosen to disrupt "cisnormativity" and "either/or thinking" among students. The Board's own principals objected that the curriculum was "not appropriate for the intended age group," presented gender ideology as "fact," "sham[ed]" students with contrary opinions, and was "dismissive of religious beliefs." The Board initially allowed parents to opt their kids out- but then reversed course, saying that no opt-outs would be permitted and that parents would not even be notified when the storybooks were read. Petitioners filed suit, not challenging the curriculum, but arguing that compelling their elementary-age children to participate in instruction contrary to their parents' religious convictions violated the Free Exercise Clause. Construing Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Fourth Circuit found no free-exercise burden because no one was forced "to change their religious beliefs or conduct." Question Presented: Do public schools burden parents' religious exercise when they compel elementary school children to participate in instruction on gender and sexuality against their parents' religious convictions and with-out notice or opportunity to opt out? Oral Advocates: For petitioners: Eric S. Baxter, Washington, D. C.; and Sarah M. Harris, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) For respondents: Alan E. Schoenfeld, New York, N.Y. Timestamps: 00:00 Introduction 00:05 Petitioner Opening Statement 02:06 Petitioner Free for All Questions Begin 18:38 Petitioner Sequential Questions Begin 53:39 Petitioner Questions End, Government Opening Statement 54:43 Government Free for All Questions Begin 1:04:21 Government Sequential Questions Begin 01:22:12 Government Questions End, Respondent Opening Statement 01:24:02 Respondent Free for All Questions Begin 01:52:42 Respondent Sequential Questions Begin 2:25:55 Respondent Questions End, Petitioner Rebuttal Begins…

Case Info: CIR v. Zuch | Case No. 24-416 | Date Argued: 4/22/25 Link to Docket: Here . Question Presented: Whether a proceeding under 26 U.S.C. 6330 for a pre-deprivation determination about a levy proposed by the Internal Revenue Service to collect unpaid taxes becomes moot when there is no longer a live dispute over the proposed levy that gave rise to the proceeding. Oral Advocates: For petitioner: Erica L. Ross, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For respondent: Shay Dvoretzky, Washington, D. C.…

Case Info: Parrish v. United States | Case No. 24-275 | Date Argued: 4/21/25 Link to Docket: Here . Background: Ordinarily, litigants must file a notice of appeal within 30 or 60 days of an adverse judgment. 28 U.S.C. § 2107(a)-(b). Under 28 U.S.C. § 2107(c) and Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6), however, district courts can reopen an expired appeal period when a party did not receive timely notice of the judgment. The Courts of Appeals have divided about whether a notice of appeal filed after the expiration of the ordinary appeal period but before the appeal period is reopened becomes effective once reopening is granted. Question Presented: Whether a litigant who files a notice of appeal after the ordinary appeal period expires must file a second, duplicative notice after the appeal period is reopened. Oral Advocates: For petitioner: Amanda Rice, Detroit, Mich. For respondent in support of petitioner: Aimee Brown, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For Court-appointed amicus curiae in support of judgment below: Michael R. Huston, Phoenix, Ariz.…

Case Info: Kennedy, Sec. of H&HS v. Braidwood Mgmt., Inc. | Case No. 24-316 | Date Argued: 4/21/25 Link to Docket: Here . Background: The U.S. Preventive Services Task Force (Task Force), which sits within the Public Health Service of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), issues clinical recommendations for preventive medical services, such as screenings and medications to prevent serious diseases. Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111 -148, 124 Stat. 119, health insurance issuers and group health plans must cover certain preventive services recommended by the Task Force without imposing any cost-sharing requirements on patients. 42 U.S.C. 300gg-13(a)(1). Question Presented: Whether the court of appeals erred in holding that the structure of the Task Force violates the Appointments Clause, U.S. Const. Art. II, § 2, Cl. 2, and in declining to sever the statutory provision that it found to unduly insulate the Task Force from the HHS Secretary’s supervision. Oral Advocates: For petitioners: Hashim M. Mooppan, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. For respondents: Jonathan F. Mitchell, Austin, Tex. Host Note: On 4/25/25, the Supreme Court ordered the parties to “file supplemental letter briefs addressing the following question: Whether Congress has ‘by Law’ vested the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services with the authority to appoint members of the United States Preventive Services Task Force. U. S. Const. art. II, §2, cl. 2.” Link to 4/25/25 Order: Here . On 5/5/25, the parties filed supplemental letter briefs. This may mean that the Supreme Court is skeptical of Respondent’s position that the Task Force members constitute principal officers and that the Supreme Court may not remand the question to the Fifth Circuit. Check out the exchange involving Mr. Mitchell on this point at 42:00.…

Case Info: Cunningham v. Cornell University | Date Decided: 4/17/25 | Case No. 23-1007 Link to Docket: Here . Question Presented: Whether a plaintiff can state a claim by alleging that a plan fiduciary engaged in a transaction constituting a furnishing of goods, services, or facilities between the plan and a party in interest, as proscribed by 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1)(C), or whether a plaintiff must plead and prove additional elements and facts not contained in the provision's text. Holding: To state a claim under §1106(a)(1)(C), a plaintiff need only plausi­bly allege the elements contained in that provision itself, without ad­dressing potential §1108 exemptions. Result: Reversed and remanded. Voting Breakdown: Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Alito filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Thomas and Justice Kavanaugh joined. Link to Opinion: Here . Advocates: For petitioners: Xiao Wang, Charlottesville, Va.; and Yaira Dubin, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) For respondents: Nicole A. Saharsky, Washington, D.C. Website Link to Oral Argument: Here . Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here .…

Case Info: Medical Marijuana, Inc. v. Horn | Date Decided: 4/2/25 | Case No. 23-365 Link to Docket: Here . Question Presented: Whether economic harms resulting from personal injuries are injuries to “business or property by reason of” the defendant's acts for purposes of civil RICO. Holding: Under civil RICO, §1964(c), a plaintiff may seek treble damages for business or property loss even if the loss resulted from a personal injury. Result: Affirmed and remanded. Voting Breakdown: Justice Barrett delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, and Jackson joined. Justice Jackson filed a concur­ring opinion. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion. Justice Kavanaugh filed a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito joined. Link to Opinion: Here . Oral Advocates: For petitioners: Lisa S. Blatt, Washington, D.C. For respondent: Easha Anand, Stanford, Cal. Website Link to Oral Argument: Here . Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here .…

Case Info: FDA v. Wages and White Lion Investments, LLC | Date Decided: 4/2/25 | Case No. 23-1038 Link to Docket: Here . Question Presented: Whether the court of appeals erred in setting aside FDA's denial orders as arbitrary and capricious. Holding: The Fifth Circuit’s conclusion that the FDA acted arbitrarily and capriciously in its adjudication of manufacturers’ premarket tobacco product applications is vacated because the FDA’s denial orders were sufficiently consistent with its predecisional guidance—as to scientific evidence, comparative efficacy, and device type—and thus did not run afoul of the change-in-position doctrine. Result: Vacated and remanded. Voting Breakdown: Justice Alito delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion. Link to Opinion: Here . Oral Advocates: For petitioner: Curtis E. Gannon, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For respondents: Eric N. Heyer, Washington, D.C. Website Link to Oral Argument: Here . Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here .…

Case Info: Medina v. Planned Parenthood South Atlantic | Case No. 23-1275 | Date Argued: 4/2/25 Link to Docket: Here . Background: More than 30 years ago, this Court first applied what would become known as the "Blessing factors," holding that a Medicaid Act provision created a privately enforceable right to certain reimbursement rates. Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 509-10 (1990). Later, the Court distilled from Wilder a multi-factor test for deciding whether a "statutory provision gives rise to a federal right" privately enforceable under Section 1983. Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340 (1997). Five years later, though, the Court disparaged Blessing's test while clarifying that only "an unambiguously conferred right is enforceable by § 1983." Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 282 (2002). Then, in Health & Hospital Corp. of Marion County v. Talevski, 599 U.S. 166, 180 (2023), the Court doubled down on Gonzaga's "demanding bar." The Court did not apply Blessing or Wilder in Talevski, but it did not overrule them either. After the Court GVR'd this case in light of Talevski, the Fourth Circuit applied Wilder and Blessing again and reaffirmed its prior opinions, maintaining a 5-2 circuit split over the first question presented and a 3-1 circuit split over the proper reading of O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Center, 447 U.S. 773 (1980), which frames the second question. Questions Presented: 1. Whether the Medicaid Act's any-qualified-provider provision unambiguously confers a private right upon a Medicaid beneficiary to choose a specific provider. 2. What is the scope of a Medicaid beneficiary's alleged right to choose a provider that a state has deemed disqualified? Oral Advocates: For petitioner: John J. Bursch, Washington, D. C.; and Kyle D. Hawkins, Counselor to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) For respondents: Nicole A. Saharsky, Washington, D. C.…

Case Info: Fuld v. PLO | Case No. 24-20 | Date Argued: 4/1/25 Link to Docket: Here . Background: The Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA), 18 U.S.C. § 2331 et seq., provides an extraterritorial private right of action for victims of terror attacks committed against American nationals abroad. In 2019, Congress amended the ATA by enacting the Promoting Security and Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act (PSJVTA). Under the PSJVTA, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and Palestinian Authority (PA) "shall be deemed to have consented to personal jurisdiction" in an ATA action if: (a) more than 120 days after the statute's enactment, they pay any terrorist convicted of or killed while committing a terror attack against an American national, and the payment is made "by reason of' the conviction or terror attack, 18 U.S.C. § 2334(e) (1)(A); or (b) more than 15 days after the statute's enactment, they "conduct any activity" while physically present in the United States (with limited exceptions), id. § 2334(e)(1) (B). The PLO and PA engaged in both categories of conduct after the trigger dates. But in the decisions below, the Second Circuit facially invalidated the PSJVTA. The court held that the Fifth Amendment forbids Congress from specifying conduct that triggers a defendant's consent to federal jurisdiction unless the statute provides the defendant with some "governmental benefit" in return, and that the PLO and PA had not received such a benefit. Question Presented: Whether the PSJVTA violates the Fifth Amendment. Host Note: Consolidated with: United States v. PLO, Case No. 24-151. Oral Advocates: For petitioners in 24-20: Kent A. Yalowitz, New York, N. Y. For petitioner in 24-151: Edwin S. Kneedler, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For respondents: Mitchell R. Berger, Washington, D. C. VIDED.…

Case Info: Rivers v. Guerrero | Case No. 23-1345 | Date Argued: 3/31/25 Link to Docket: Here . Background: Under the federal habeas statute, a prisoner "always gets one chance to bring a federal habeas challenge to his conviction," Banister v. Davis, 590 U.S. 504, 509 (2020). After that, the stringent gatekeeping requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2) bar nearly all attempts to file a "second or successive habeas corpus application." Here, petitioner sought to amend his initial habeas application while it was pending on appeal. The Fifth Circuit applied § 2244(b)(2) and rejected the amended filing. The circuits are intractably split on whether § 2244(b)(2) applies to such filings. The Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits hold that § 2244(b)(2) categorically applies to all second-in-time habeas filings made after the district court enters final judgment. The Second Circuit disagrees, applying § 2244(b)(2) only after a petitioner exhausts appellate review of his initial petition. And the Third and Tenth Circuits exempt some second-in-time filings from § 2244(b)(2), depending on whether a prisoner prevails on his initial appeal (Third Circuit) or satisfies a seven-factor test (Tenth Circuit). Question Presented: Whether § 2244(b)(2) applies (i) only to habeas filings made after a prisoner has exhausted appellate review of his first petition, (ii) to all second-in-time habeas filings after final judgment, or (iii) to some second-in-time filings, depending on a prisoner's success on appeal or ability to satisfy a seven-factor test. Oral Advocates: For petitioner: Peter A. Bruland, Washington, D.C. For respondent: Aaron L. Nielson, Solicitor General, Austin, Tex.; and Matthew Guarnieri, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)…

Case Info: Catholic Charities Bureau v. WI Labor Review Comm'n | Case No. 24-154 | Date Argued: 3/31/25 Link to Docket: Here . Background: Wisconsin exempts from its state unemployment tax system certain religious organizations that are "operated, supervised, controlled, or principally supported by a church or convention or association of churches" and that are also "operated primarily for religious purposes." Petitioners are Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Superior and several sub-entities. Although all agree Catholic Charities is controlled by a church-the Diocese of Superior-the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that Catholic Charities is not "operated primarily for religious purposes" and thus does not qualify for the tax exemption. Specifically, the court held that Catholic Charities' activities are not "typical" religious activities because Catholic Charities serves and employs non-Catholics, Catholic Charities does not "attempt to imbue program participants with the Catholic faith," and its services to the poor and needy could also be provided by secular organizations. Questions Presented: 1. Does a state violate the First Amendment's Religion Clauses by denying a religious organization an otherwise-available tax exemption because the organization does not meet the state's criteria for religious behavior? 2. In addressing federal constitutional challenges, may state courts require proof of unconstitutionality "beyond a reasonable doubt?" Oral Advocates: For petitioners: Eric C. Rassbach, Washington, D. C.; and Curtis E. Gannon, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) For respondents: Colin T. Roth, Assistant Attorney General, Madison, Wis.…

Case Info: Bondi, Att'y Gen. v. VanDerStok | Date Decided: 3/26/25 | Case No. 23-852 Link to Docket: Here . Questions Presented: Whether "a weapon parts kit that is designed to or may readily be completed, assembled, restored, or otherwise converted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive," 27 C.F.R. 478.11, is a "firearm" regulated by the Gun Control Act of 1968 (GCA); and Whether "a partially complete, disassembled, or nonfunctional frame or receiver" that is "designed to or may readily be completed, assembled, restored, or otherwise converted to function as a frame or receiver," 27 C.F.R. 478.12(c), is a "frame or receiver" regulated by the GCA. Holding: The ATF’s rule is not facially inconsistent with the GCA. The GCA’s statute’s text, context, and structure make clear the GCA reaches some weapon parts kits and unfinished frames or receivers. Result: Reversed and remanded. Voting Breakdown: Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson joined. Justices Sotomayor, Kavanaugh, and Jackson each filed concurring opinions. Justices Thomas and Alito each filed dissenting opinions. Link to Opinion: Here . Oral Advocates: For petitioners: Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. For respondents: Peter A. Patterson, Washington, D. C. Website Link to Oral Argument: Here . Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here .…

Case Info: United States v. Miller | Date Decided: 3/26/25 | Case No. 23-824 Link to Docket: Here . Question Presented: Whether a bankruptcy trustee may avoid a debtor's tax payment to the United States under Section 544(b) when no actual creditor could have obtained relief under the applicable state fraudulent-transfer law outside of bankruptcy. Holding: Section 106(a)’s sovereign-immunity waiver applies only to a §544(b) claim itself and not to state-law claims nested within that fed­eral claim. Result: Reversed. Voting Breakdown: Justice Jackson delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Chief Justice Roberts, along with Justices Thomas, Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh and Barrett. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion. Link to Opinion: Here . Oral Advocates: For petitioner: Yaira Dubin, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. For respondent: Lisa S. Blatt, Washington, D. C. Website Link to Oral Argument: Here . Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here .…

Case Info: FCC v. Consumers' Research | Case No. 24-354 | Date Argued: 3/26/25 Link to Docket: Here . Background: In 47 U.S.C. 254, Congress required the Federal Communications Commission (Commission) to operate universal service subsidy programs using mandatory contributions from telecommunications carriers. The Commission has appointed a private company as the programs' Administrator, authorizing that company to perform administrative tasks such as sending out bills, collecting contributions, and disbursing funds to beneficiaries. Questions Presented: 1. Whether Congress violated the nondelegation doctrine by authorizing the Commission to determine, within the limits set forth in Section 254, the amount that providers must contribute to the Fund. 2. Whether the Commission violated the nondelegation doctrine by using the Administrator's financial projections in computing universal service contribution rates. 3. Whether the combination of Congress's conferral of authority on the Commission and the Commission's delegation of administrative responsibilities to the Administrator violates the nondelegation doctrine. Host Note: Consolidated with: SHLB Coalition V. Consumers' Research, Case No. 23-422. Oral Advocates: For petitioners in 24-354: Sarah M. Harris, Acting Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. For petitioners in 24-422: Paul D. Clement, Alexandria, Va. For respondents: R. Trent McCotter, Washington, D. C. VIDED.…